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ABSTRACT: We consider a perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium 
market for a single homogeneous good with a (bounded) continuum of 
infinitesimal firms. Cost functions are essentially unrestricted and 
are allowed to vary smoothly across firms. We introduce a sequence 
(net) of Cournot markets (each with a finite number of firms) which 
converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both 
the inverse demand functions and the distribution of firm technologies 
and show that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a 
Cournot equilibrium and all the Cournot equilibria converge to the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market. 
PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS AS mE LIMITS OF COURNOT MARKETS 
William Novshek 
1. Introduction
A growing literature has been examining the noncooperative 
foundations of perfect competition by comparing the limits of 
noncooperative equilibria of a sequence of markets (or economies) and 
the perfectly competitive equilibria of the limit market (or economy). 
See for example Dasgupta and Ushio [2], Fraysse and Moreaux [3], Hart 
[4], Mas-Colell [5], Novshek [6], Novshek and Sonnenschein [8,9], and 
Ushio [10,11]. Here we examine this problem in the context of a 
single, partial equilibrium market for a homogeneous good. We 
consider a limit market, M(O), with a bounded continuum of 
infinitesimal firms. Since individual infinitesimal firms cannot 
affect aggregate output or market price, firms must act as price 
takers, and the proper notion of equilibrium is the usual perfectly 
competitive equilibrium for the market. We also consider markets 
M(a), a E (0,1], in which firms are not infinitesimal. We assume 
firms correctly perceive their influence on price, and use pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in outputs (or Cournot equilibrium) as the 
equilibrium concept in these markets. We show that if the ... aemand 
sectors of M(a) converge smoothly to the demand sector of M(O), and 
the production sectors of M(a) converge smoothly to the production 
sector of M(O) in terms of the distribution of firm types, then (1) 
for all small a, M(a) has a Cournot equilibrium and (2) the Cournot 
equilibria of M(a) converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium 
of M(O) as a converges to zero. We allow firms to differ within and 
between markets, and allow average cost curves to have any shape. 
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The results are a substantial generalization of Novshek [6] in 
which all firms were identical within markets and rescaled versions of 
each other between markets, with average cost U-shaped (or 
decreasing). Other than standard assumptions on cost and inverse 
demand functions, our only assumption needed for eventual existence of 
Cournot equilibrium and convergence of the Cournot equilibria to the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market is that the 
markets M(a) converge smoothly to the limit market M(O). 
The existence proof follows from showing that for small a we 
can apply an existence theorem for n-firm Cournot equilibria which 
does not require identical firms or nondecreasing marginal cost (see 
Novshek [7]). That theorem shows that if each reaction correspondence 
ri is nonincreasing in the sense that Y' > Y implies max ri(Y') �
min ri(Y) (as is the case when each firm's marginal revenue is
decreasing in the aggregate output of other firms) then a Cournot 
equilibrium exists. Bamon and Fraysse [1] independently proved a 
similar (though weaker) result in the form of a fixed point theorem 
and used. it to show existence of Cournot equilibrium in a market in
which demand is sufficiently large (due to replication of the consumer 
sector) relative to the capacity constraint of firms and a constant 
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determined by the derivatives of the inverse demand function. 
The convergence result follows from the smooth convergence of 
M(a) to M(O). If the limiting aggregate output is not the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium of M(O) then for a sufficiently small some 
firm could improve its profit by changing output, and the purported 
Cournot equilibrium would not in fact be an equilibrium. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce 
the model and basic assumptions. Section 3 contains the results and 
proofs. Section 4 contains some remarks exploring the nature of the 
assumptions and how they can and cannot be weakened. 
2. The Model
For each element of [0,1] we define a different market. M(O) 
will be a perfectly competitive market with a continuum of 
infinitesimal firms. For each a E (0,1], M(a) will be an imperfectly 
competitive market with a finite number of noninfinitesimal firms. 
The inverse demand function in M(O) is P(",0) and the inverse demand 
function in M(a) is P(",a). We assume both that standard conditions 
hold for each inverse demand function and that the inverse demand 
function for M(a) converges smoothly to the inverse demand function 
for M(O): 
(Al) P : JR+ X [0,1] -7 JR+ is twice continuously differentiable;
P(Y,0) converges to zero as Y converges to m; and P1 < 0
whenever P > 0, where subscripts on P denote partial 
derivatives. 
In order to define the production sectors of each market so 
that the production sector for M(a) converges smoothly to the 
production sector for M(O) we introduce : 
(A2) T : [0,1]3 -7 JR+ is continuously differentiable; and
3 T(x,y,z) + x(l-x)Tl(x, y,z) L 0 for all (x,y,z) e [0,1] • where 
subscripts on T denote partial derivatives. 
The production sector for M(O) consists of a continuum of 
infinitesimal firms with output dependent on expenditure: if firm 
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p e [0,1] spends c L 0 then its output is y(c,O,p) := cTCc/Cc+l),O,p). 
If c(p) is the expenditure of firm p, p E [0,1], then aggregate 
expenditure is �c(p)dp and aggregate output is �y(c(p),O,p)dp. (The
integrals are with respect to Lebesgue measure.) Note that output is 
nondecreasing in expenditure: 
ilcc,o,p>ac T(c/Cc+l),O,p) + [c/Cc+l)][l - c/Cc+l)]T1Cc/Cc+1),0,p) LO.
Set up costs are allowed since y(c,0,p) = 0 for c > 0 is possible, and 
the shape of the derived average cost curve is essentially 
unrestricted. 
For a E (0,1] the production sector for M(a) consists of a 
finite number of noninfinitesimal firms with output dependent on 
expenditure. Let [1/al be the greatest integer less than or equal to 
1/a. M(a) has [1/al firms and if firm j E {1,2, • • •  , [1/al} spends 
c L 0 then its output is y(c,a,ja) = cTCc/Cc+a),a,ja). Aggregate 
expenditure (aggregate output) is found by summing the expenditures 
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(outputs) over the [l/al firms. As for M(O), by A2 �(c,a,ja) 2 0,
and the cost functions are essentially unrestricted. 
To see the relationship between the production sectors of the 
M(a) and M(O) note that if T(0,a,0) e T(",O,") and y cTCc /Cc+l) ,0,13) 
then ay = acT(ac /Cac+a),a,13). This implies that the average cost
curve for firm 13 in M(a) is a rescaling of the average cost curve for 
13 in M(O) exactly as in Novshek [6]: the average cost in M(a) for y 
is the same as the average cost in M(O) for y/a. By assumption the 
"normalized" cost functions of firms in M(a) converge smoothly to the 
cost functions of the corresponding firms in M(O). 
We define T on the closed set [0,1]3 to guarantee that the
aggregate production possibilities for M(a) converge to those for M(O) 
(see Remark 1 Section 4). The aggregate production set in M(a), 
Cl,lal I Y(a) = )._, {(-c,y) S (-Il+) X JR+ y � y(c,a.ja)}.
J=l 
converges to the aggregate production set in M(O), 
r1 I Y(O) = Jo {(-c,y) S (-Il+) X JR+ y � y(c,0,13)}dl3
{ c-c. y) s (-Il +' x JR+ 1 c-c. y) = J: c-c c13>.y(l3))d13 for some c c13 » 
13 e [0,1] where y(l3) � y(c(p),0,13) for all pJ.
in the following sense. For any z S Y(O) and sequence {�} converging
to zero, there exists a sequence {zk} converging to z such that 
zk S Y(�) for all k. Also, for any sequences {�} converging to zero
and {xk } converging to x such that � S Y(';c) for all k, x is a limit 
point of Y(O). Both of these convergence results follow using 
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standard arguments concerning the approximation of integrals by finite 
sums since T and its derivatives are uniformly continuous. 
If we define the cost of producing output y for firm 13 in 
market M(a) as c(y,a,13) := min{c E JR+ l y(c,a,13) 2 y} for outputs that
are feasible then we can define a Cournot equilibrium for M(a). 
Definition: A set of feasible nonnegative outputs {y1,y2 • • • •• y[l/aJ}
is a Cournot equilibrium for M(a) if for all i S {1,2, • • •  ,[l/a]} 
[t� [t�P( y.,a)y. - c(y.,a,ia) 2 P( y.-y.+y,a)y - c (y,a,ia) forJ=l J 1 1 J=l J 1 
all y 2 0 which are feasible for firm i. The set of Cournot 
equilibriWD aggregate outputs for H(a) is defined as 
q1a1 I C(a) := { )..., y. £y1,y2 • • • •  ,y[l/al} is a Cournot equilibriWD forJ=l J 
M(a)}. 
We must define the "perfectly competitive equilibriWD" of M(O) 
with a 1 i ttle care since the usual "supply equals demand" definition 
may not work. For example, if T(x,0,13) = x then all firms are 
identical and have strictly decreasing average cost, 
(1/2) + (1/2)..jl + 4/y. Aggregate supply in M(O) is zero at any price
less than or equal to one, but infinite at any price strictly above 
one. In this case we define the "perfectly competitive equil ibriWD" 
price as the price at which supply "crosses" demand. Let S(p) be the 
"supply correspondence" defined as S(p) := (y S JR+U{m} I there exist
c S 1R+U(m} and a sequence ((-ck,yk)} C Y(O) which converges to (-c,y)
such that sup {(l,p) • z l z E Y(O)} = lim(l,p) • (-ck,yk)}.k 
Definition: (p*.Y*) is the "perfectly competitive equilibrium" for 
M(O) if 
( i) P(Y*,0) = p* and 
(ii) p• = sup {p E JR+ l s(p) c [O,Y•]}. 
This is the usual "supply equals demand" definition when that 
works. In other cases it extends the usual definition so that a 
"perfectly competitive equilibrium" always exists. 
3. Theorem and Proof
We are now ready to state our main results: For a 
sufficiently small M(a) has a Cournot equilibrium, and the aggregate 
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Cournot equilibrium outputs for M(a). C(a). converge to the "perfectly 
competitive equilibrium" output Y•. By the coni:inui ty of P and the 
fact that the aggregate production sets converge. this implies that 
Cournot equilibria of M(a) exist and are approximately price taking 
equilibria when a is sufficiently small. This provides further 
support for the "Folk Theorem" that when firms are small relative to 
the market then the outcome is approximately competitive. 
Theorem: Let M(a). a E (0,1] and M(O) be the markets defined by P and 
T and assume Al and A2 hold. Let (p*. Y*) be the "perfectly 
competitive equilibrium" for M(O). Then for all e > ·a··there 
exists an a' > 0 such that for all a e (0,a'l. 
(i) C(a) � 0 i.e • • M(a) has a Cournot equilibrium, and, 
(ii) C(a) C [Y•-e .Y•+e]. 
Proof: Pick e ) O. We start with some basic observations. 
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Let t= max {T(x,a,p) l (x,a.p) E [0,1]3}. By A2, t < m. If t = 0 then
no firm is productive, C(a) = {O} for all a, and the results of the 
Theorem hold since (p*.Y*) = (P(0,0) ,0). Henceforth assume t > O. 
For feasible outputs y. the average cost of producing y for firm P in
M(a) is c(y.a,p)/y = l/T(c(y,a.p)/(c(y.a.p)+a),a.p) 1 l/t. If 
P(0,0) < l/t then for a sufficiently small no firm could ever be 
active without incurring losses. and again the results of the Theorem 
hold with C(a) { 0} for all small a. Assume P(0,0) 2 l/t for the 
remainder of the proof. If l/T(l,O,p) < p for some p then a positive 
measure of firms in M(O) can produce arbitrarily large outputs at 
average cost less than p, so the "perfectly competitive equilibrium" 
price p* must be less than p. Finally. by Al there exist a E (0.1]. 
& E (u,m), e'  E CO.el. and Y' E (Y*,m) such that for all a e (0,al. 
y E [0,e'], and Y E  [O,Y'], both P(Y'.a) < l/t and 
P1CY+y,a) + yP11CY+y,a) < -&. For all i, if Y is the aggregate output
of other firms and y is the output of firm i then the firm's marginal 
revenue is decreasing in both y and Y in this region. 
We now turn to the proof of part (ii) of the Theorem. For all 
a sufficiently small p' := P(Y*,0)/2 + P(Y*+e ,0)/2 ) P(Y*+3e/4 ,a). 
and in any Cournot equilibrium (y1 • • • •  ,y[l/al) for M(a). if
"f y. 2 Y* + 3e/4 then firm i faces marginal revenue which is 
J'7;i J 
everywhere less than p', and firm i's Cournot equilibrium action is 
not larger than its optimal response to a fixed price p'. For any 
output y 2 e/4 the corresponding expenditure is c 2 e/4t and average 
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cost is l/T(c/(c+a),a,ia). For all p, l/T(l,O,p) 2 p* > p' so for a 
sufficiently small no firm could profitably produce y 2 s/4 in any 
Cournot equilibrium with aggregate output Y• + s or larger. Thus for 
[�] 
all i, if � y. > 
J=l J 
Y* + s then f y. 2 Y* + 3r./4 and firm i's actionJ1i J
is no larger than its competitive response to the fixed price p'. But 
the aggregate production set for M(a) converges to the aggregate 
production set for M(O), so for small a the aggregate competitive 
supply for M(a) at price p' < p* is less than or equal to the 
aggregate competitive supply for M(O) at price p'/2 + p*/2, which is 
less than Y* + s. Thus C(a) C [0,Y*+s] for all small a. 
To complete the proof of part (ii) pick s'' E (O,s'] and 
a' e (0,a] such that for all 8 e [0,s''] and a e (0,a'] 
p := P(Y*,0)/2 + P(Y*-s'',0)/2 < P(Y*-3s/4,a) + (s/4)P1(Y*-3s/4,a).
For a E (0,a'] and s E (0,s''], if (y1, • • •  ,y[l/a]) is a Cournot
equilibrium for M(a) and f y. i Y* - s then firm i faces marginal
J'°fi J
revenue which exceeds p for all actions less than or equal to s/4. 
Thus yi must be no less than the competitive supply for a firm with 
technology identical to firm i's except that output cannot exceed s/4, 
facing fixed price p. The sum of these restricted producti�n sets 
converges to the aggregate production set for M(O) as a converges to 
zero (this follows just as the convergence result for the unrestricted 
production sets), so for sufficiently small a the aggregate 
(restricted) competitive supply at price p () p*) is no less than the 
aggregate (restricted) competitive supply at p*/2 + p/2 which exceeds 
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Y* - s. Thus C(a) C [Y*-s,m) for all small a. This completes the 
proof of part (ii). 
We now turn to the proof of part (i). By our choice of s', a, 
and Y', for all a E (0,a] and & E (0,s'], if we restrict the firms in 
M(a) to outputs y i s then each firm's marginal revenue is declining 
in both its own output, y, and the aggregate output of other firms, Y, 
as long as Yi Y'. But P(Y',a) < l/t so no firm could ever profitably 
produce if other firms produced Y > Y'. Thus, with these restricted 
production sets we are able to apply the existence theorem of Novshek 
[7] to show the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. It remains to 
show that the restriction y i s can be removed.
As noted in the proof of part (ii), the sum of the restricted 
production sets converges to the aggregate production set of M(O) as a 
converges to zero, so an argument similar to the proof of part (ii) 
shows that the aggregate production in the Cournot equilibrium is 
close to Y* for a sufficiently small. For any � > 0, for all p, for 
all y > s, either y is not a feasible output for p in M(a) or, letting 
c
= 
c(y,a,p) > s/t, l/{T(c/(c+a),a,p) + (ac/(c+a)2)T1(c/(c+a),a,p)J >
p• - �for all sufficiently small a (since l/T(l,O,p) 2 P* for all p). 
Thus for all � > 0, for all sufficiently small a all firms have 
marginal cost exceeding p* - � for all outputs y > s. All elements of 
these firms' reaction correspondences (with unrestricted output) are 
no bigger than the larger of s and the optimal action for a firm with 
constant marginal and average cost p* - �· 
Pick s E (0,s'], � E (0,-sP1(Y*,0)/3], and a' E (0,a] such
that for all a E (0,a'], when firms are restricted to y� e Cournot 
equilibrium exists for M(a) and aggregate output lies in 
[Y• + �/P1CY•,O), Y* - �/P1(Y•,O)]. If (y1, • • • ,y[l/a]) is such a
Cournot equilibrium then for all i, f y. L 
J1i 3 
Y* + �/P1CY•,O) - e and
for sufficiently small e, for all sufficiently small a the optimal 
response by a firm with constant marginal and average cost p• - � is 
less than (Y(�,a) - lY* + �/P1CY•,O) - e))/2 + e/12 where Y(�,a) is
defined by P(Y(�,a),a) = p• - �· (This follows from the uniform 
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convergence of P(",a) and P1(0,a) to P(",O) and P1(",0), where P(",O)
and P1(",0) are arbitrarily close to linear functions on
[Y•-2e ,Y•+2eJ for s sufficiently small.) As a converges to zero 
Y(�,a) converges to Y•--ii/P1CY•,O) and
(Y(�,a) - (Y•�/P1CY•,O) - e))/2 + e/12 converges to -�/P1CY•,O) +
7e/12 < e/3 + 7e/12 < e. Thus for sufficiently small a no firm 
prefers to switch to an output exceeding e, and the Cournot equilibria 
with restricted outputs are also Cournot equilibria with unrestricted 
outputs. 
Q. E.D. 
4. Remarks
(4.1) The cost functions for the firms were introduced in a rather 
unorthodox manner for a partial equilibrium market. This is because 
we need as a basic assumption that the markets M(a) converge to the 
perfectly competitive market M(O). To see this we will consider an 
example in which cost functions are introduced directly. Though the 
12 
cost functions are seemingly well behaved, the markets M(a) do not 
converge to M(O). 
Consider the cost function c(y,O,p) = y + C../l-p)y2, and for
all a e (0,1], c(y,a,p) = - 2 y + C,/1-p>y /a. This cost function has the
rescaling property for average cost curves: for all p, for all a > 0, 
for all y > 0, c(y,a,p)/y = c(y/a,O,p)/Cy/a). The competitive supply 
in M(O) is �[(p-1)/(2,/1-p)]dp = p-1 for p 2 1 and zero otherwise.
The competitive supply for M(a) does not converge to this function. 
For any integer n, when a = l /n M(a) has a firm Cp = Cl/ala = 1) with 
constant average cost at level one. Competitive supply in M(l/n) is 
1R+ at p = 1 and unbounded at any p > 1. 
For P(Y,a) := 3 - Y there is a unique Cournot equilibrium for 
each a E (0,1], with aggregate output 
Q(a) 
Cl,lal 
__ Cl,L.al 
{ /_, 2a/(a + 2,/1-ja)) / {l + )__ a/Ca
3=1 3=1 
+ 2../1-ja)). 
The perfectly competitive equilibrium for M(O) is (p•,Y• )  = (2,1) 
while the limit points of Q(a) as a converges to zero are all outputs 
in [1,4/3]. The convergence result fails because the markets M(a) do 
not converge to market M(O). 
The problem is that in M(O) the constant returns to scale 
technology has zero mass (only p = 1 has it) with very small mass for 
firms close to it in technological terms (for y > 0, a ap<c(y,O,p)/y)
is unbounded as P approaches 1) while in M(l/n), the constant returns
to scale technology is available to one firm, and is unaffected by a. 
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The proportion of firms with the constant returns to scale technology 
does converge to zero but the size of the firm relative to the market 
does not. For all a > 0 the single firm could meet market demand at 
price p = 1 without incurring losses. With Lebesgue measure in M(O) 
the single firm is irrelevant for aggregate output. Note that if the 
rescaling property for average cost curves held and the maximum 
possible output of firms was uniformly bounded in M(O) then this 
problem would not arise (feasible outputs for firms in M(a) would be 
uniformly bounded by a times the bound for M(O) by the rescaling 
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sufficiently small a, where K is a constant determined by the minimum 
efficient scale of the marginal firm in M(O) and the derivatives of P 
and T evaluated at points corresponding to the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium of M(O). 
It is well known that when firms have identical "fixed cost 
plus constant marginal cost" technologies and the rescaling property 
holds for average cost curves then the bound for small a can be 
sharpened to [Y*-K./;_, Y•+KJ;.1 where K is a constant (see Dasgupta and
Ushio [2], Fraysse and Moreaux [3], and Ushio [10,11]). This result 
property). can be extended to the case in which firms are not identical. 
The problem arises at arbitrarily large outputs. By defining 
T on [0,1]3 the properties of average cost "at infinity" are
determined by T(l,a,�). The smoothness assumption on T guarantees 
that M(a) converges to M(O) in terms of the production sector. 
(4.2) The assumption that T be continuously differentiable ruled out 
production with avoidable set up costs and constant marginal cost. 
However, this case could be easily treated. Any firm's output with 
average cost greater than max P(O,a) would never be chosen, so 
a e [0,1] 
cost functions of this type could be modified in the irrelevant region 
to satisfy the smoothness assumption on T. This would in no way
affect the results. 
(4.3) The convergence result (part (ii) of the Theorem) can be 
improved in the following ways. If firms have U-shaped average cost 
then the bounds in (ii) can be sharpened to [Y*-Ka, Y*+Ka] for 
(4.4) Can the results be extended to allow "free entry?" By this we 
mean is it possible to set up the model so that for small a there are 
equilibria at which some firms are inactive. In some circumstances 
this can be accomplished by starting with a sufficient mass of firms 
in M(O) (that is, allowing �€ [0,B] for B sufficiently large). In 
one case it is not possible. 
First consider the cases with identical firms and the 
rescaling property for average cost curves. For the case of strictly 
positive set up cost and constant marginal cost, the number of active 
firms in M(a) is on the order of 1/./-;_ if a countable infinity of firms 
is available (see for example Dasgupta and Ushio [2]). Since 
Cl/,/�)/[l/a] converges to zero as a converges to zero, for a 
sufficiently small the [l/a] firms available in M(a) are already more 
than enough to have some firms inactive in equilibrium. For the case 
of U-shaped average cost with minimum average cost p*, attained at 
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output y• > 0 (in M(l), and with curvature of the average cost curves 
at y•) and Y* the output satisfying P (Y*,O) = p•, when the mass of 
available firms in M (O) exceeds Y•/y•, for sufficiently small a the 
equilibria of M(a) will have inactive firms. Finally, for the case of 
no set up costs and nondecreasing marginal cost, for any a either all 
firms or no firms will be active in equilibrilllll. Since average cost 
is nondecreasing, if any firm is earning strictly positive prof it then 
any inactive firm could produce a small output at a positive profit. 
If any firm produces positive output and earns zero profit it could 
produce less, thus increasing price and profit. Thus it is never 
possible to extend this case to have both active and inactive firms in 
equilibrium. (With a countable infinity of available firms there is 
no equilibrilllll in this case unless the monopoly output is zero. ) 
Now consider the case in which firms within M (O) differ, and 
assllllle the differences include differences in minimum (or infimum) of 
average cost, MAC(a,p), with �C(O,p) bounded away from zero. Then
for a sufficiently large mass of available firms in M(O) there will be 
a marginal firm, the "least efficient" active firm, and a pool of 
inactive firms in the perfectly competitive equilibrium. For a 
sufficiently small Cournot equilibria exist, and by the convergence 
result we know that some firms must be inactive in equilibri�
(approximately those with minimum average cost exceeding p*). Thus 
Cournot equilibria with both active and inactive firms can exist for 
small a in all cases when firms differ in terms of minimum average 
cost. 
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This discussion shows that in all cases we have considered 
except the case of identical firms with no set up costs and 
nondecreasing marginal cost, we can extend the Theorem to the case of 
an unbounded nlllllber of firms: an unbounded mass p S [0,=) in M (O) and 
a countable infinity of firms j E {l,2,3, • • •  } in M (a) for all 
a e (0,1]. 
17 
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